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THE PROPER BORDERS OF PADILLA:  
COURTS MUST AVOID OVER-EXPANSION 
OF SIXTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS 
TERRENCE REGAN† 
INTRODUCTION 
You have nothing to worry about.  Relying on his attorney’s 
advice, Jose Padilla decided to plead guilty to felony drug 
trafficking in Hardin County Circuit Court, in Hardin County, 
Kentucky.1  As recommended in his plea agreement, Padilla was 
sentenced to serve a five-year prison term, followed by five years 
on probation.2  Padilla elected to take the certainty of the 
bargained-for sentence, rather than take his chances in front of a 
jury.3 
You’ve been in the country so long, you won’t get deported.  
Jose Padilla came to the United States in the 1960s after being 
born in Honduras in 1950.4  He became a lawful permanent 
 
† Senior Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., 2013, St. John’s 
University School of Law; A.B., 2009, College of the Holy Cross. I would like to 
thank my parents and the rest of my family and friends for their encouragement and 
support. 
1 Brief for Petitioner at 2, Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (No. 08-651). 
2 Id. at 9. 
3 The brief for the petitioner describes this as only a “meager benefit.” Id. at 10. 
The brief goes on to describe the possible consequences had Padilla decided to go to 
trial: 
Had Padilla gone to trial, he would not only have forced the Commonwealth 
to its proof of guilt by a reasonable doubt, but he also would have been 
entitled to request jury sentencing (and to present mitigating sentencing 
evidence). He may have received a substantially lower sentence than ten 
years, perhaps the minimum of five years. In any event, he would have 
been parole eligible after serving 20% of his sentence. Thus, even if he had 
gone to trial and received the maximum sentence of ten years, he would 
have been eligible for parole within approximately a year from conviction 
(given his credit of 365 days for time served). Padilla nonetheless chose to 
accept the certainty of a five year term of imprisonment with five years 
probated. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
4 Id. at 8. 
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resident and served honorably in Vietnam.5  At the time of his 
arrest in 2001, he lived with his family in California and worked 
as a licensed commercial truck driver.6 
But Padilla did have something to worry about.  He could—
and almost certainly would—get deported.  Under federal 
immigration law, “Any alien who . . . has been convicted of a 
violation of . . . any law . . . relating to a controlled 
substance . . . is deportable.”7  As discussed below, the 
development of immigration law in the last half century has 
made deportation a near-automatic result for aliens convicted of 
felonies.8  This is especially true when the conviction is for a drug 
crime.9  Padilla’s only remaining avenue for relief was to seek to 
vacate his guilty plea through a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, for his attorney’s failure to warn him about deportation 
consequences.  This laid the groundwork for the Supreme Court 
to re-evaluate its existing ineffective assistance doctrine as well 
as the application of that doctrine in the lower state and federal 
courts. 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that Padilla’s attorney 
had failed to render effective assistance of counsel by misadvising 
Padilla about the deportation consequences of his guilty plea.10  
Explicitly, the Court’s holding was narrow:  A criminal defense 
attorney has the duty to provide accurate advice regarding 
deportation to a noncitizen client.11  Implicitly, however, the 
Court caused a major shake-up in Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence by undermining the longstanding direct-collateral 
consequences doctrine followed by lower courts.12  With the 
longstanding doctrine seemingly marginalized, courts hearing 
ineffective assistance claims were thrust into a state of flux.  
Though it was clear that a criminal defense attorney now had to 
advise his client about deportation, there were no clear directives 
for when guilty pleas were challenged based on failed advice 
regarding other “collateral” consequences. 
 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012) (emphasis added). 
8 See infra notes 78–83 and accompanying text. 
9 See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 362–63 nn.4–5. 
10 Id. at 368–69. 
11 Id. at 364. 
12 The Court noted that it had never endorsed the direct-collateral doctrine as a 
part of Sixth Amendment analysis. Id. at 364 n.8, 365. 
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This Note proposes a new method of Sixth Amendment 
analysis.  This analysis is consistent with the Court’s decision in 
Padilla v. Kentucky and its other Sixth Amendment precedent.  
It also responds to concerns that criminal defendants are treated 
fairly, on the one hand, and that the criminal justice system is 
not overburdened by an undermined plea system, on the other.  
This Note argues that the focus of the “competence prong” of the 
ineffective assistance test must be focused on the attorney’s 
knowledge and his action in relation to that knowledge.  When an 
attorney knows—or reasonably should know—that a collateral 
consequence is looming over his client’s conviction, the Supreme 
Court, this Note, and common sense demand that the attorney 
advise his client on the matter. 
Part I of the Note reviews the development of Sixth 
Amendment doctrine that established the right of an indigent 
defendant to be provided with counsel at trial, as well as at other 
stages of a criminal proceeding where his rights could be 
substantially affected.  Part I next notes the Court’s recognition 
that the Sixth Amendment not only protects a defendant’s right 
to have counsel present, but also requires that the counsel be 
effective.  This Part then looks at the current doctrine for claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, which are governed by the 
1972 Supreme Court case, Strickland v. Washington.  This 
section reviews the two-pronged test established by the 
Strickland Court for resolving defendants’ motions for post-
conviction relief.  Part I concludes with a review of the direct and 
collateral consequences doctrine, which has been created and 
employed by lower courts to determine the applicability of 
Strickland in cases where the advice of counsel—or lack 
thereof—is at issue. 
Part II of this Note identifies the traditional problems with 
the direct-collateral doctrine and will argue that lower courts 
applying Padilla have not cured these defects in Sixth 
Amendment law.  Part II.A discusses the problems inherent in 
defining “direct” and “collateral” consequences.  Part II.B then 
discusses the policy considerations at stake in Sixth Amendment 
cases.  Finally, Part II.C reviews the three basic applications of 
Padilla to the direct-collateral doctrine and will argue that none 
of these approaches are satisfactory. 
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This Note concludes in Part III by proposing a new method of 
Sixth Amendment analysis that focuses on attorney knowledge.  
This proposed method is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
holdings in Padilla and Strickland and addresses the competing 
public policy concerns over fairness to criminal defendants and 
the institutional “floodgates” concern. 
First, Part III, using language from Padilla, identifies which 
consequences, like deportation, are “not categorically removed” 
from Sixth Amendment relief.13  This section argues that certain 
consequences, like deportation and the traditional “direct” 
consequences are “not categorically removed,” and thus are 
always subject to ineffective assistance claims.  This section also 
argues that, though there are other consequences which may also 
fall in this category, courts should be hesitant to expand this 
category too far. 
Part III next identifies circumstances in which any 
consequence—direct or collateral—should be subject to claims for 
ineffective assistance.  All of these circumstances have, at their 
foundation, a basis to conclude that the attorney had some 
knowledge of the consequence and yet failed to act as an effective 
advocate.  The first, and clearest, circumstance is affirmative 
misadvice.  The next circumstance, which is harder to prove, is 
when the attorney fails to give any advice, but where there is 
evidence that the attorney knew—or should have known—that 
the consequence was in play.  This section of the Note will 
identify potential sources of evidence to show what an attorney 
knew or should have known. 
I. ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
A. The Right to Assistance of Counsel 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees certain rights to those 
who stand accused in criminal prosecutions.  Among these 
guaranteed rights is the accused’s right to “Assistance of 
Counsel.”14  Though this seems to be a straightforward  
 
 
 
13 Id. at 366 (“We conclude that advice regarding deportation is not categorically 
removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”). 
14 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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proposition, the exact requirements of the Sixth Amendment’s 
right to counsel have been subject to much uncertainty and 
development throughout this country’s history. 
The right to retain private defense counsel has never been 
subject to debate, but the extension of the Sixth Amendment 
beyond this basic right has been continually developing in the 
last eighty years.15  The first major development in the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel came in the Court’s decision in 
Powell v. Alabama.16  Relying on the Due Process Clause, the 
Court held in Powell that the defendant’s right to a fair trial 
required that an indigent defendant be appointed counsel.17  
Though the Powell decision was grounded in due process 
considerations, six years after Powell, the Court held in Johnson 
v. Zerbst18 that the right to appointed counsel, like the right to 
privately retained counsel, was properly found in the guarantees 
of the Sixth Amendment.19  Though Powell and Johnson were 
originally held not to apply to state cases, absent some special 
circumstances,20 the guarantee of counsel was eventually 
extended to all indigent defendants, regardless of the charges 
they faced.21 
Though the Powell decision is grounded in concerns that the 
defendant receive a fair trial, the Court has held that the 
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment extend to other phases of a 
criminal prosecution.  In Evitts v. Lucey,22 the Court extended 
Sixth Amendment protection to a defendant taking a first appeal 
from a criminal conviction.23  The Supreme Court has held that 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel extends to any part of a 
criminal proceeding where the defendant’s rights are 
substantially at risk,24 which includes the plea-bargaining phase 
of the prosecution.25 
 
15 Randy J. Sutton, Annotation, Construction and Application of Sixth 
Amendment Right to Counsel—Supreme Court Cases, 33 A.L.R. FED. 2d 1 (2009). 
16 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
17 Id. at 73. 
18 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
19 Id. at 462–63. 
20 See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942). 
21 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963). 
22 469 U.S. 387 (1985). 
23 Id. at 393–94. 
24 Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967). 
25 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985). 
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B. The Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel 
The due process requirement for a fair trial, according to the 
Court in Powell, was not satisfied when 
“circumstances . . . preclude[d] the giving of effective aid” from 
counsel.26  This requirement of effective aid was read into the 
Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel ten years 
after Powell, in Glasser v. United States.27  However, neither 
Powell nor Glasser established what, if anything, would render 
the assistance of counsel, appointed or privately retained, 
ineffective. 
In certain circumstances, the Court has recognized a strong 
presumption of ineffectiveness of counsel, establishing what some 
commentators describe as a per se rule.28  One such circumstance 
occurs where the state in some way interferes with counsel’s 
ability to effectively serve his client.29  The Court has recognized 
several different types of state interference as a denial of the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel.30 
The other circumstance in which the Court has recognized a 
strong presumption of ineffectiveness is where an attorney’s 
performance is rendered ineffective by some conflict of interest.31  
The presumption of ineffectiveness is not quite as strong in this 
circumstance as it is when state interference is involved.32  Only 
when an attorney “actively represent[s] conflicting interests,” 
and such conflict hampers the attorney’s representation of the 
defendant, is ineffectiveness presumed.33 
 
 
26 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (emphasis added). 
27 Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942). 
28 See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.7(d) (3d ed. 2011). 
29 See id. § 11.8(a). 
30 See Geders v. United States¸ 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976) (holding that a court 
order that an attorney not consult his client during an overnight recess constituted 
state interference); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 865 (1975) (holding that a 
statute prohibiting closing argument at a bench trial violated the Sixth 
Amendment); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 613 (1972) (holding that a statute 
requiring the defendant, if he testified, to be the first defense witness was 
unconstitutional); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 596 (1961) (holding, on Fifth 
Amendment grounds, that prohibiting direct examination of a defendant who had 
made an unsworn statement violated due process). 
31 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 28, § 11.9(a). 
32 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984). 
33 Id. (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel After Strickland v. 
Washington 
The Supreme Court did not consider any questions 
concerning “actual ineffectiveness”—not including a conflict of 
interest34—until 1984.35  In Strickland, the Court held that a 
defendant could prevail on a claim of actual ineffectiveness only 
by satisfying a two-pronged standard.36  To satisfy Strickland’s 
first prong, a defendant must “show that counsel’s performance 
was deficient.”37  A court applying this prong may use “prevailing 
professional norms,” such as American Bar Association 
standards, as “guides” in evaluating an attorney’s representation 
of his client.38  The Supreme Court cautioned, however, that such 
standards and norms “are only guides” and courts should be 
“highly deferential” when scrutinizing an attorney’s strategic 
decisions.39 
To satisfy Strickland’s second prong, “the defendant must 
show that the deficient performance [of counsel] prejudiced the 
defense.”40  An error by counsel will not be set aside if the error 
did not impact the result of the criminal proceeding.41  The 
defendant must also satisfy this second prong, which requires an 
affirmative showing that there is a “reasonable probability”42 
that the proceeding would have been more favorable to the 
defendant without counsel’s errors.43 
The focus of the inquiry into the effectiveness of counsel 
should be “whether . . . the result of the particular proceeding is 
unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process.”44  
It is from counsel’s primary role as an advocate for the defendant 
in the adversary system that all other duties arise.45  In United 
 
34 See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980). 
35 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. 
36 Id. at 687. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 688. 
39 Id. at 688–89. 
40 Id. at 687. 
41 Id. at 691. 
42 Id. at 694 (“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome [of the adversarial proceeding].”). 
43 Id. The Court noted that the governing legal standard in the proceeding—
generally, “beyond a reasonable doubt” in a criminal proceeding—serves a “critical 
role” in establishing prejudice. Id. at 682, 695. 
44 Id. at 696. 
45 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655–56 (1984). 
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States v. Cronic, a companion case to Strickland, the Court 
emphasized the importance that counsel act as the defendant’s 
advocate, holding that “if the process loses its character as a 
confrontation between adversaries, the constitutional guarantee 
is violated.”46  The Court, in both Strickland and Cronic, used its 
emphasis on the adversarial process to dissuade subsequent 
decision-makers from turning ineffective assistance claims into 
attorney performance reviews.47 
D. Direct and Collateral Consequences 
In applying Strickland, both federal and state courts have 
imported a doctrine used in a related area of law.  Under Brady 
v. United States,48 a trial court is required to inform a defendant 
pleading guilty of the direct consequences of the plea and 
resulting sentence.49  By implication, then, due process did not 
require that a pleading defendant be advised of consequences 
that were merely “collateral” to the pled-to crime. 
Though the direct-collateral distinction was created in a 
Fifth Amendment case, both federal and state courts began 
applying the direct-collateral distinction to Sixth Amendment 
cases soon after Brady.50  Despite its widespread use, the 
Supreme Court did not consider whether the direct-collateral 
distinction was properly being applied to Sixth Amendment cases 
until more than forty years after the distinction was created in 
Brady.51 
When the question finally came before the Court in Padilla 
v. Kentucky, the Court’s holding on the matter was very limited.  
The Court noted that it had “never applied a distinction between 
direct and collateral consequences” in Sixth Amendment 
assistance of counsel cases.52  The Court, however, did not take 
this opportunity to decide whether the distinction was generally 
relevant to Sixth Amendment inquiries.53  Instead, the Court 
 
46 Id. at 656–57. 
47 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686; Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656–57. 
48 397 U.S. 742 (1970). 
49 Id. at 755. 
50 See Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel 
and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 706–08 (2002). 
51 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364 (2010). 
52 Id. at 365. 
53 Id. (“Whether that distinction is appropriate is a question we need not 
consider in this case because of the unique nature of deportation.”). 
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restrained itself, holding only that “[t]he collateral versus direct 
distinction is . . . ill-suited to . . . the specific risk of 
deportation.”54 
The Supreme Court’s holding that deportation was not a 
“collateral” consequence was not a complete departure from the 
lower courts; to the extent that lower courts realized an exception 
to the direct-collateral consequences rule, that exception was 
deportation.  State courts in Colorado, Indiana, Ohio, Oregon, 
and California have all recognized, to some degree, that a 
noncitizen defendant may be entitled to the advice of counsel on 
the matter.55  An increasing number of state statutes and court 
rules have allowed for a deportation exception to the direct-
collateral consequences rule.56  This exception likely stems from 
the formerly recognized duty of an attorney to advise his client as 
to the availability of a Judicial Recommendation Against 
Deportation (“JRAD”)—a procedure which was eliminated by 
statute in 1990.57 
The direct-collateral doctrine has been sharply criticized.  
Many commentators see collateral consequences as a “secret 
sentence.”58  These commentators see the direct-collateral 
doctrine as an effective denial of counsel with regard to this 
“sentence.”59  Proponents of the distinction, meanwhile, have 
their concerns voiced in Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in 
Padilla.  In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that “[a]dding to 
counsel’s duties an obligation to advise about a conviction’s 
collateral consequences has no logical stopping-point.”60  The fear 
on this side of the debate is that the inclusion of collateral 
consequences into an attorney’s duties to advise will overburden 
attorneys and courts.61  They also fear that the inclusion will  
 
 
 
 
54 Id. at 366. 
55 Chin & Holmes, supra note 50, at 708 (noting that some decisions may have 
relied on state law, rather than constitutional, grounds). 
56 Id. 
57 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 363. 
58 Chin & Holmes, supra note 50, at 700. 
59 Id. 
60 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 390 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
61 See Derek Wikstrom, Note, “No Logical Stopping-Point”: The Consequences of 
Padilla v. Kentucky’s Inevitable Expansion, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 351, 367–68 (2012). 
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severely erode the reliability and finality of guilty pleas, upon 
which much of the efficient and orderly operation of the criminal 
justice system relies.62 
II. PADILLA HAS ADDED TO THE EXISTING CONFUSION 
SURROUNDING SIXTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS BASED ON ATTORNEY 
ADVICE 
The direct-collateral doctrine, even before the Court’s 
decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, suffered from two major 
problems.  First, application of the doctrine was very uncertain.  
The definition of “direct” and “collateral” varied from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction.63  Further, there were some consequences, such as 
deportation, which were neither definitively direct nor 
definitively collateral.64  Second, both liberal and strict 
interpretations of the doctrine posed significant policy concerns.  
A liberal application of the direct-collateral doctrine raised 
institutional concerns.  Courts and commentators rejecting a 
liberal application cite the “floodgates concern”—that liberal 
application of the direct-collateral doctrine would put almost all 
guilty pleas in danger of being vacated on Strickland claims.65  
Even if these pleas would not ultimately be vacated, the need to 
hold a Strickland hearing would put a tremendous burden on the 
criminal justice system.66  Those favoring a liberal approach, 
however, argue that any institutional concerns created by the 
liberal application are far outweighed by concerns for the 
defendant who pled guilty based on his attorney’s 
incompetence.67  These courts and commentators argue that the 
allure of quick and efficient resolution of cases by plea bargain 
can induce defense lawyers, prosecutors, and even judges to 
ignore “collateral” consequences that may be of utmost 
 
62 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 371. 
63 See Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct 
Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent 
Predators”, 93 MINN. L. REV. 670, 689–93 (2008). 
64 See Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, 
Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 124–
125 (2009) (stating that while courts considered “direct” consequences to be those 
that were penal sanctions, some consequences were labeled as “collateral” even 
though they were severe). 
65 See Chin & Holmes, supra note 50, at 736. 
66 See id. at 736–37. 
67 See Jenny Roberts, Proving Prejudice, Post-Padilla, 54 HOW. L.J. 693, 743 
(2011). 
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importance to the defendant.68  The Sixth Amendment, the 
argument continues, is the only way to ensure that every 
defendant will have access to information about the potentially 
life-altering consequences of his or her plea.69 
The Padilla decision has contributed to confusion in this 
area.  The Court spoke definitively only on deportation; the 
extension of its holding was left to speculation and interpretation 
by lower courts.  Courts applying Padilla have generally followed 
one of three different methods.  Some courts have read Padilla as 
obliterating the distinction between direct and collateral 
consequences.70  Others have read Padilla as leaving the direct-
collateral doctrine untouched, except for a new carve-out for 
deportation.71  A third approach that is taken by some courts is to 
apply the old direct-collateral doctrine for the time being, holding 
that Padilla does not apply retroactively to pleas taken before 
the decision was handed down.72 
This Part identifies and details the problems inherent in the 
direct-collateral doctrine and argues that none of the three 
readings of Padilla currently employed by lower courts 
adequately address these problems.  First, Part II.A discusses 
the inconsistent application of the direct-collateral doctrine 
before Padilla.  Then, Part II.B discusses the policy 
considerations underlying the application of the direct-collateral 
doctrine, and argues that the pre-Padilla application failed to 
strike a proper balance.  Finally, Part II.C demonstrates that the 
Padilla decision, as well as its application in subsequent lower 
court decisions, failed to correct—and in some cases made 
worse—these issues. 
 
 
68 Paisly Bender, Comment, Exposing the Hidden Penalties of Pleading Guilty: A 
Revision of the Collateral Consequences Rule, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 291, 305 
(2011). 
69 See id. at 304–05. 
70 See, e.g., Malia Brink, A Gauntlet Thrown: The Transformative Potential of 
Padilla v. Kentucky, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 39, 42 (2011). 
71 See, e.g., People v. Bennett, 28 Misc. 3d 575, 579, 903 N.Y.S.2d 696, 699 
(N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Bronx Cnty. 2010). 
72 See, e.g., Barrios-Cruz v. State, 63 So. 3d 868, 873 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
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A. Major Problem with the Direct-Collateral Doctrine Pre-
Padilla Was Its Inconsistent Application 
The first problem with the direct-collateral doctrine is 
inherent in the doctrine itself.  The terms “direct” and “collateral” 
have seemingly no certain definitions and there is often 
significant overlap between the two categories.  One of the few 
certainties in this area is that the prison sentence and fine 
attached to a conviction are “direct” consequences.73  Beyond 
these two rather obvious examples, however, there is significant 
discrepancy as to what is direct and what is collateral.  The D.C. 
Circuit acknowledged this problem by noting that “[t]he 
distinction between a collateral and a direct consequence of a 
criminal conviction, like many of the lines drawn in legal 
analysis, is obvious at the extremes and often subtle at the 
margin.”74 
The problem with the traditional distinction between “direct” 
and “collateral” consequences is that the definitions of the two 
terms are not perfectly complementary.  “Direct” consequences 
typically involve only those consequences that concern the 
“nature of the sentence” imposed for a crime.75  “Collateral” 
consequences, on the other hand, are described as “stem[ming] 
from the fact of conviction rather than from the sentence of the 
court.”76  Where exactly direct consequences end and collateral 
consequences begin varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.77  The 
two definitions are best illustrated as a pair of circles in a Venn 
diagram.  When the definitions are strictly applied, there is no 
intersection of the circles, and some consequences will fall into 
the void between the circles.  When the definitions are liberally 
applied, the circles intersect too much, leaving very few 
consequences that are purely direct or purely collateral. 
Before Padilla, deportation was particularly difficult to 
classify as direct or collateral.78  Though most states held that 
deportation was merely a collateral consequence, removed from 
Sixth Amendment protection, there were several state courts  
 
 
73 Chin & Holmes, supra note 50, at 699. 
74 United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
75 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 28, § 21.4(d). 
76 Roberts, supra note 63, at 678 (emphasis added). 
77 Id. at 679–80. 
78 See Chin & Holmes, supra note 50, at 708. 
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that had held that a noncitizen defendant had a right to advice 
about the deportation consequences of his guilty plea.79  Other 
states imposed this right by statute or court rule.80 
Part of the difficulty in classifying deportation as collateral 
lies in the unique development of deportation law over the course 
of the twentieth century.  The key development in this area was 
the elimination of the JRAD.81  Once available as a means to 
mitigate the potential for deportation based on a conviction, 
several federal circuits held that a noncitizen defendant who was 
not informed about JRAD was entitled to a Sixth Amendment 
claim.82  The elimination of JRAD in the early 1990s made 
deportation a near-automatic consequence for noncitizen 
defendants convicted of a wide range of crimes.83  This change in 
the law took deportation entirely out of a judge’s—even a federal 
judge’s—hands, which arguably made deportation more 
“collateral” than “direct” for the purposes of the Sixth 
Amendment.84  However, it was difficult to rationalize 
eliminating the protection of the Sixth Amendment when the 
change in the law had made the possibility of deportation not 
only harsher, but also more predictable. 
Though the most “diversity of opinion” regarding the 
application of the direct-collateral doctrine came in cases 
concerning deportation, there were many other consequences 
where the doctrine was far from uniform.  Consequences which 
could significantly impact the length or manner of imprisonment 
were deemed collateral by some courts because the trial court 
had minimal power over the consequence.85  Other courts, 
however, saw these consequences as affecting the “nature” of the 
 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Adonia R. Simpson, Note, Judicial Recommendations Against Removal: A 
Solution to the Problem of Deportation for Statutory Rape, 35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. 
& CIV. CONFINEMENT 489, 502 (2009). 
82 See Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449, 455 (2d Cir. 1986) (requiring a 
noncitizen defendant to be advised as to the availability of JRAD procedures). 
83 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 363–64 (2010). 
84 See id. at 364–65. 
85 See Holmes v. United States, 876 F.2d 1545, 1548–49 (l1th Cir. 1989) (holding 
ineligibility for parole is a collateral consequence); United States v. Rubalcaba, 811 
F.2d 491, 494 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a defendant need not be advised that he 
was to serve his prison sentences consecutively, rather than concurrently); State v. 
Barton, 609 P.2d 1353, 1356 (Wash. 1980) (en banc) (holding that a defendant need 
not be advised that he would receive a heightened sentence because he was a repeat 
offender). 
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sentence, and thus were “direct.”86  This category of consequences 
acutely exposes the shortcoming of the traditional distinction 
between direct and collateral consequences.  Though they are 
technically closest to the “collateral” definition, they can have an 
immediate and severe impact on the “direct” sentence for the 
crime. 
Another area where courts have differed as to the 
availability of Sixth Amendment relief is when the consequences 
may have a more profound impact on the defendant’s life than 
his sentence might.  Deportation may fit in this category, but as a 
very extreme example.  Similar, if less severe, consequences 
include disqualification from public benefits and loss of 
professional licenses.87  Many courts held that these 
consequences were collateral, as they were both outside the 
purview of the criminal court and only tenuously connected to the 
“direct” consequences of conviction.88  Other courts have focused 
on the fact that these consequences may outweigh the direct 
consequences for certain defendants and have held that, in these 
circumstances, the defendant should be protected by the Sixth 
Amendment.89 
Though the direct-collateral doctrine was one of the “most 
widely accepted” doctrines among lower courts before Padilla,90 
each jurisdiction accepted the doctrine only on its own terms.  
Courts struggling to define and distinguish “direct” and 
“collateral” doctrines would reach disparate results because they 
emphasized different aspects of the doctrine.91  Thus, a court 
focused on the unique development of immigration law would 
provide Sixth Amendment relief for deportation.92  Meanwhile, a 
 
86 See Ashley v. State, 614 So. 2d 486, 490 (Fla. 1993) (requiring advice about 
repeat offender laws); People v. Flannigan, 267 N.E.2d 739, 744 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971) 
(requiring advice that sentences would be served consecutively); State v. Smith, 513 
So. 2d 544, 547–49 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (requiring that a defendant be advised about 
unavailability of parole). 
87 Chin & Holmes, supra note 50, at 705–06. 
88 Id. at 704–05. 
89 See id. at 705–06. 
90 See id. at 699. 
91 Compare People v. Soriano, 240 Cal. Rptr. 328, 336 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding 
that defendant had been deprived of effective assistance of counsel when his 
attorney failed to advise him of immigration consequences), with State v. Smith, 513 
So. 2d 544, 547–49 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (finding ineligibility for parole was a direct 
consequence). 
92 See Soriano, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 336. 
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jurisdiction more concerned with the true impact of direct 
consequences would likely protect a defendant who was 
uninformed about the unavailability of parole, mandatory 
consecutive sentencing, or heightened sentencing for repeat 
offenders.93  Other courts, finding that the relative impact of the 
“collateral” consequences was greater than that of the “direct” 
consequences, could grant relief for those subject to loss of public 
benefits or professional licenses.94  At least one of these 
considerations was likely to play a role in any court’s resolution 
of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, making the “widely 
accepted” direct-collateral doctrine diverse and unpredictable 
across jurisdictions. 
B. The Direct-Collateral Doctrine Failed To Strike the Proper 
Balance Between Institutional Concerns for the Criminal 
Justice System and Fairness Considerations for Individual 
Defendants 
Analysis of Sixth Amendment claims takes on added 
significance in the context of guilty pleas.  The criminal justice 
system relies on guilty pleas to resolve the vast majority of 
disputes in the system.  Without guilty pleas, there would be 
almost no feasible way to handle the tremendous caseload 
coming through courthouses in nearly every jurisdiction in the 
United States.  A liberal application of the Sixth Amendment in 
this context potentially subjects all guilty pleas to being 
overturned in collateral proceedings.95  If defense attorneys, 
prosecutors, and judges could not rely on the finality of pleas 
given in open court, the entire system would be crippled.  This 
would not only hurt the court system, but it would also hurt 
defendants seeking to plead guilty.  Often, defendants use guilty 
pleas to secure favorable dispositions, to avoid having evidence of 
their wrongdoing put before a jury, and to ensure a quick 
resolution to their encounter with law enforcement.96  However, if 
 
93 See Smith, 513 So. 2d at 547–49. 
94 See, e.g., United States v. Littlejohn, 224 F.3d 960, 966–67 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(finding that defendant’s disqualification from public benefits following his 
conviction is a direct consequence); see also Barkley v. State, 724 A.2d 558, 560–61 
(Del. 1999) (holding that automatic revocation of a driver’s license is a direct 
consequence). 
95 Chin & Holmes, supra note 50, at 702. 
96 Jerold H. Israel, Excessive Criminal Justice Caseloads: Challenging the 
Conventional Wisdom, 48 FLA. L. REV. 761, 774–75 (1996). 
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institutional concerns over protecting the finality of guilty pleas 
are given too much weight, the pleading defendant is put at 
significant risk of being blindsided by “collateral” consequences 
that would have significantly altered their decision to plead. 
1. Institutional Concerns at Risk in the Guilty Plea Context 
Though a jury trial is often thought to be the identifying 
characteristic of the American criminal system, the truth is that 
criminal trials are becoming increasingly rare.  According to the 
Department of Justice, over ninety percent of convictions come as 
a result of a guilty plea.97  Recognizing the mounting importance 
of the plea-bargain regime, the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
for a significant number of cases defining the plea process.98 
In its decisions on ineffective assistance claims, the Court 
has recognized some concerns specific to plea bargains.  In Premo 
v. Moore,99 the Court noted that the plea bargain system relied on 
stability.100  The availability of Sixth Amendment relief injected 
instability into this system by subjecting bargained-for 
dispositions to judicial second-guessing.  If a court failed to 
“accord the latitude” granted to counsel under Strickland’s 
competence prong, prosecutors could lose faith in the finality of 
bargained pleas, leading them to withhold plea offers—“a result 
favorable to no one.”101  This instability poses a threat not only to 
cases where a guilty plea is ultimately taken, but also to any case 
where a guilty plea is offered; this uncertainty would affect 
nearly every case that came through the criminal justice 
system.102 
Extending Sixth Amendment protection to “collateral” 
consequences is particularly scary for attorneys and judges in the 
criminal system because they will have little, if any, control over 
the ultimate resolution of the proceeding producing the 
consequence.  The Illinois Supreme Court was unsettled by this 
prospect, stating that “a criminal court is in no position to advise 
 
97 BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2009—STATISTICAL TABLES 22, 
24 tbl.21 (2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf. 
98 Stephanos Bibas, Essay, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From 
Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1118–19 (2011). 
99 131 S. Ct. 733 (2011). 
100 Id. at 741–42. 
101 Id. at 742. 
102 See Chin & Holmes, supra note 50, at 736. 
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on all the ramifications of a guilty plea personal to a 
defendant.”103  The Illinois Supreme Court was concerned that 
overstating the protection of the Sixth Amendment would leave 
the guilty pleas taken in the court system subject to being 
vacated by any one of the “numerous” and “logically 
unforeseeable” collateral consequences following the conviction.104 
2. Concerns for Fairness to the Defendant Taking the Plea. 
Though the plea bargaining system, in theory, should bestow 
equal benefits on the state and the defendant, there are 
circumstances where an incompetent defense counsel may take 
away this “mutuality of advantage.”105  The direct-collateral 
doctrine was an attempt to account for this scenario.  However, 
this distinction rested on the simplistic and sometimes faulty 
premise that the “direct” consequences of a conviction were the 
most serious for a criminal defendant.106 
Whether or not the direct consequences of a conviction 
outweigh the collateral consequences is generally a fact-sensitive 
inquiry.  The relative importance can only be ascertained on a 
case-by-case basis, taking into account the unique features of the 
defendant.  For a noncitizen, the prospect of deportation will 
almost always outweigh the connected prison term, especially if 
the defendant has a family in the United States or has been in 
this country so long that he no longer has a home in his native 
country.107  In the case of almost any defendant, the difference 
between consecutive and concurrent sentencing, or the date for 
potential parole, can have a tremendous impact on the decision to 
plead.  These consequences, sometimes deemed “collateral,” can 
greatly impact the length of imprisonment—the key “direct” 
consequences.108 
 
 
 
103 People v. Williams, 721 N.E.2d 539, 544 (Ill. 1999). 
104 Id. (internal quotation marks ommited).  
105 Bibas, supra note 98, at 1125 (internal quotation marks ommited). 
106 See id. at 1131. 
107 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 n.48 (2001). 
108 Chin & Holmes, supra note 50, at 700 (“[S]ome courts hold that counsel has 
no obligation to advise his client that prison sentences may be served consecutively 
rather than concurrently, even if that means, for example, that the client will serve 
forty rather than twenty years.”). 
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Critics of the direct-collateral doctrine point to the Court’s 
language in Strickland to support the argument that this case-
by-case approach is true to Sixth Amendment precedent.109  In 
Strickland, the Court explicitly stated that a Sixth Amendment 
inquiry is an inherently fact-sensitive inquiry that is not 
compatible with bright-line rules.110  The direct-collateral 
distinction, thus, seems wholly incompatible with Strickland. 
C. The Current Application of Padilla in Lower Courts Does Not 
Fix the Existing Problems with Sixth Amendment Analysis 
Though the Padilla opinion was expressly limited to 
deportation, other parts of the Court’s opinion have provided a 
basis for lower courts to depart from the traditional direct-
collateral doctrine.  As a practical matter, the Court’s attempt to 
limit Padilla to deportation has not limited the extension of the 
opinion to other collateral consequences, but rather has limited 
the guidance which the opinion gives to other courts that are 
abandoning the direct-collateral doctrine.111  With this lack of 
guidance, courts have taken a variety of approaches to analyzing 
ineffective assistance claims based on attorney advice.  However, 
none of these new methods solve the issues present in the 
existing direct-collateral doctrine. 
1. The “Direct Plus Deportation” Approach 
The most conservative approach taken by lower courts in 
applying Padilla has been to simply adhere to the old direct-
collateral distinction, simply using deportation as an add-on to 
the direct category.112  These courts focus on the limiting 
 
109 Id. at 712; see Roberts, supra note 63, at 694. 
110 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (“In any case 
presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether 
counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.”). 
111 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010). 
112 See, e.g., Miller v. State, 11 A.3d 340, 352 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010), vacated, 
32 A.3d 1 (Md. 2011); People v. Kabre, 29 Misc. 3d 307, 32122, 905 N.Y.S.2d 887, 
899 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2010). These two lower state court decisions uphold 
the direct-collateral doctrine by holding that Padilla does not apply retroactively to 
pleas taken before the decision was handed down. This approach has been criticized 
as an attempt to punt the issue, withholding the inevitable judgment for a later 
date. See McGregor Smyth, From “Collateral” to “Integral”: The Seismic Evolution of 
Padilla v. Kentucky and Its Impact on Penalties Beyond Deportation, 54 HOW. L.J. 
795, 815–16 (2011). The retroactivity of the Padilla decision depends on whether the 
decision announced a new rule of constitutional law or merely applied an old rule. 
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language in the Padilla decision and generally hold that the 
direct-collateral doctrine continues to apply in full force.113  
Courts justify such a holding by referencing the Supreme Court’s 
explicit limitation of Padilla.114  The Court went to great lengths 
to demonstrate the uniqueness of deportation,115 noting that the 
direct-collateral distinction was “ill-suited . . . [for] the specific 
risk of deportation,”116 and expressly declined to rule on the 
general applicability of the direct-collateral doctrine in other 
circumstances.117 
The problem with this approach is that it is too conservative.  
Construing Padilla in this way does almost nothing to address 
the problems with the direct-collateral doctrine.118  In 
jurisdictions where deportation was already afforded Sixth 
Amendment protection, this approach changes literally nothing.  
In other jurisdictions, it reduces the uncertainty inherent in the 
distinction only to the extent that deportation is unquestionably 
included among direct consequences.  Aside from the inclusion of 
deportation, the definition of “direct” and “collateral” are no 
clearer after Padilla than they were before the decision came 
down. 
2. The “Enmeshed Consequences” Approach 
Some courts and commentators have used the language in 
the Padilla decision that focuses on the close connection between 
a criminal conviction and deportation.  These courts see a similar 
connection between other traditionally collateral consequences 
and hold that these consequences are entitled to Sixth 
Amendment protection.119  These decisions seek to establish a 
clearer and more workable definition of direct consequences.   
 
 
 
See Consequences of Convictions After Padilla v. Kentucky: Retroactivity, CRIM. 
PRAC. GUIDE, July/Aug. 2011, at 3. 
113 See Miller, 11 A.3d at 352. 
114 See id. at 341. 
115 See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360. 
116 Id. at 357 (emphasis added). 
117 Id. at 365. 
118 See supra notes 103–09 and accompanying text. 
119 See Bauder v. Dep’t of Corr., 619 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding 
that an attorney must advise his or her client of the potential of civil commitment 
upon pleading guilty). 
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These courts also recognize that, though the Court withheld any 
general judgment on the direct-collateral doctrine, the doctrine is 
on shaky ground after the Padilla decision.120 
The chief danger in this approach is that of over-expansion.  
It is this approach that Justice Scalia was concerned about in his 
dissent, when he stated that the majority’s opinion has “no 
logical stopping-point.”121  All “consequences” of a criminal 
conviction, whether direct or collateral, bear some relation to the 
criminal conviction by their definition as consequences.122  This 
approach causes significant institutional concerns, as it can lead 
toward a slippery slope, opening the floodgates to Sixth 
Amendment litigation. 
This approach also marginalizes the limiting language of the 
Court in Padilla.  This is inappropriate.  The limits of the Court’s 
decision should not be read as a mere exercise of judicial 
restraint.  Such a reading ignores that the Court went to great 
length to establish the uniqueness of deportation.123  Especially 
significant in the Court’s opinion is the development of 
immigration law—from a largely discretionary system to a 
regime of near-automatic deportation—and the former treatment 
of JRAD proceedings as a direct consequence.124  These courts 
also fail to recognize that the Court’s application of Strickland to 
deportation was not an especially radical decision; to the extent 
that an exception to the direct-collateral distinction existed 
before Padilla, that exception was deportation.125 
3. The “Important Consequences” Approach 
The Court in Padilla, in holding that Strickland applied, 
noted that deportation was particularly severe and likely of great 
importance to a noncitizen defendant.126  Other courts have 
picked up on this language and have replaced the direct-
collateral doctrine with an analysis focused primarily on the 
 
120 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372. 
121 Id. at 390 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
122 A “consequence” is “something produced by a cause or necessarily following 
from a set of conditions.” “Consequence” Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/consequence (last visited Jan. 25, 2014). 
123 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360–64 (majority opinion). 
124 Id. 
125 See Chin & Holmes, supra note 50, at 708. 
126 See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365–66 (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 
(2001)). 
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importance of the consequence to the defendant.  One such court 
was the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Graviano, which 
held that a defendant is entitled to Sixth Amendment protection 
for any consequence which he can show is “of such great 
importance to him that he would have made a different decision 
had that consequence been disclosed.”127  This approach is readily 
compatible with Strickland’s requirement that bright line rules 
be avoided in Sixth Amendment claims. 
However, this approach has significant problems.  First, this 
approach conflates the competence and prejudice prongs of 
Strickland.  The competence prong is focused on attorney 
behavior, not fairness to the defendant.128  By mandating that 
attorneys advise their clients about any and all “sufficiently 
important” consequences, this approach shifts the focus of 
Strickland’s first prong to the mindset of the defendant.129  In 
doing so, this approach practically eliminates the competence 
prong; it would be hard to imagine a scenario where the 
defendant would satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland but 
would fail to show that the consequence which caused the 
prejudice was not “sufficiently important” to him.  There is no 
rational reading of Padilla which would support this elimination 
of the competence prong. 
A second problem with this approach is that it handcuffs 
defense counsel, taking away the wide latitude given by 
Strickland’s first prong.  As the Court recognized in Premo v. 
Moore, a quick guilty plea can often be in the best interest of a 
defendant.130  In many criminal proceedings, the prosecution’s 
case is weakest at the outset of the plea bargaining stage, which 
often begins before the state has had much time to build a case 
against the defendant.131  At this critical point, defense counsel 
may have the opportunity to extract the most favorable 
disposition for his or her client.132  If defense attorneys are 
constitutionally mandated to investigate all “sufficiently 
important” consequences, as this approach requires, many 
defendants may miss their chance at the most favorable 
 
127 People v. Gravino, 14 N.Y.3d 546, 559, 928 N.E.2d 1048, 1056, 902 N.Y.S.2d 
851, 859 (2010). 
128 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
129 Gravino, 14 N.Y.3d at 559, 928 N.E.2d at 1056, 902 N.Y.S.2d at 859. 
130 See Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 741 (2011). 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
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disposition.  In this circumstance, it will be the time taken by the 
attorney to prod for any potentially important collateral 
consequence that will prejudice the defendant. 
III. THE COMPETENCE PRONG AFTER PADILLA 
Though some commentators have read Padilla as a “seismic” 
shift in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence,133 such an 
interpretation ignores the great lengths the Court went to 
highlight the uniqueness of deportation.  Nowhere is this more 
apparent than in Section I of the opinion where, before the Sixth 
Amendment is mentioned, the Court detailed the unique 
evolution of immigration and deportation in this country.134  
Further, the seismic shift reading of Padilla blatantly disregards 
the Court’s holding that “[t]he collateral versus direct distinction 
is thus ill-suited to evaluating a Strickland claim concerning the 
specific risk of deportation.”135  Finally, the seismic shift reading 
accounts for neither the decisions in lower state and federal 
courts around the country,136 nor the court rules and statutes in 
force in many jurisdictions,137 which have all treated deportation 
differently than other collateral consequences of conviction. 
The uniqueness of deportation, however, should also give 
pause to anyone who reads Padilla as the Court’s endorsement of 
the direct-collateral doctrine in all cases not involving 
deportation.  The Court went as far as it could to distance itself 
from the direct-collateral doctrine without striking it down.138  
The Court acknowledged the use of the doctrine in state and 
lower federal courts,139 but refused to strictly apply the doctrine 
in finding that deportation is “not categorically removed from the 
ambit of the Sixth Amendment.”140 
This Part argues that Padilla did not radically change or 
expand the requirements of the Sixth Amendment.  Rather, the 
decision made only minor changes to existing Sixth Amendment 
 
133 See Smyth, supra note 112, at 798. 
134 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360–64 (2010). 
135 Id. at 366 (emphasis added). 
136 See Chin & Holmes, supra note 50, at 708. 
137 See id. 
138 See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365 (“We, however, have never applied a distinction 
between direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of constitutionally 
‘reasonable professional assistance’ required under Strickland.”). 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 366. 
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doctrine.  This Part argues that a proper reading of Padilla 
creates a two-pronged inquiry into claims for Sixth Amendment 
relief that must be satisfied before the Strickland standard can 
be applied.  First, a court should determine whether the 
particular consequence is “categorically removed” from Sixth 
Amendment relief.  If not, the court should analyze the claim 
under Strickland.  If the consequence is categorically removed, 
however, a Sixth Amendment claim may proceed to the 
Strickland test if it falls within one of two exceptions.  
A. What Consequences Are “Not Categorically Removed” from 
Sixth Amendment Relief? 
The Court’s analysis in Padilla makes clear that, though the 
Strickland test is at the heart of a Sixth Amendment claim, it is 
not the starting point of the analysis.  Before the Court began its 
Strickland analysis of Padilla’s claim, it first devoted a 
significant portion of its opinion to determining whether 
Strickland applied at all.141  The Court ultimately held that 
Strickland did apply to Padilla’s claim, because deportation is 
“not categorically removed” from Sixth Amendment relief.142 
The Court’s holding in this section, that Strickland applies 
when a consequence is “not categorically removed” from Sixth 
Amendment relief, implies two things.  First, the Court implies 
that there are consequences of a guilty plea that are categorically 
removed from “the ambit of the Sixth Amendment.”143  Second, 
the Court implies that, if Strickland generally applies to 
consequences which are “not categorically removed,” then, by 
negative inference, Strickland generally does not apply to 
consequences that are categorically removed.  The question then 
becomes:  What consequences, like deportation, are “not 
categorically removed” from Sixth Amendment protection? 
1. Traditional Direct Consequences and Deportation Are “Not 
Categorically Removed” from Sixth Amendment Protection 
It is uncontroversial that the traditional “direct” 
consequences—the sentence and fine stemming from a criminal 
conviction144—are not categorically removed from Sixth 
 
141 Id. at 365–66. 
142 Id. at 366. 
143 Id. 
144 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 28, § 21.4(d). 
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Amendment protection.  Padilla did not question the existing 
Sixth Amendment protection afforded to direct consequences; it 
expanded that protection to deportation, a consequence not 
traditionally thought of as “direct.”145  It is equally 
uncontroversial that deportation is not categorically removed 
from Sixth Amendment protection; Padilla explicitly held as 
much.146 
The Court found that deportation was akin to traditional 
direct consequences in a number of ways, which made it difficult 
to classify it as a collateral consequence.147  Though deportation 
was a civil, not criminal, sanction, the Court was convinced that 
a defendant was protected from deportation consequences by the 
Sixth Amendment because deportation was “particularly severe” 
and “intimately related to the criminal process.”148  The 
entanglement of deportation and criminal convictions was the 
key consideration that led the Court to apply Strickland to 
Padilla’s claim. 
2. Other Consequences of Conviction Which May Be “Not 
Categorically Removed” from Sixth Amendment Protection 
Padilla broadened the category of consequences to which the 
Strickland test applied, but the question is by how much.  While 
the jail sentence, the fine, and now, the deportation consequences 
of conviction are clearly subject to the protection of the Sixth 
Amendment, it is unclear to what else these protections apply.  
This line-drawing problem was often encountered by courts 
trying to apply the traditional direct-collateral doctrine.149  What 
is clear, though, is that Padilla requires a line to be drawn 
somewhere.150  The Court gives some guidance as to where that 
 
145 See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366. 
146 Id. at 374. 
147 Id. at 365–66. 
148 Id. at 365. The Court found that deportation had been “enmeshed” with 
convictions for nearly a century and was a nearly automatic consequence for a 
noncitizen’s conviction. This made deportation “most difficult” to separate from the 
conviction itself, both for the Court and especially for noncitizen defendants. Id. at 
365–66 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 
(2001); United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). 
149 See United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“The 
distinction between a collateral and a direct consequence of a criminal conviction, 
like many of the lines drawn in legal analysis, is obvious at the extremes and often 
subtle at the margin.”). 
150 See supra Part III.A. 
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line may be.  To be deemed “not categorically removed” from 
Sixth Amendment protection, a consequence of criminal 
conviction need not technically be a “criminal sanction.”151  
However, it must be so “intimately related to the criminal 
process” that it is “difficult to divorce the penalty from the 
conviction.”152 
Consequences resulting in prolonged civil or criminal 
custody may satisfy these elements.  This category of 
consequences includes civil commitment, heightened sentencing 
requirements for repeat offenders, availability of concurrent 
rather than consecutive sentences, and timing and availability of 
parole.153  These consequences have a significant impact on the 
length of time the defendant is confined.154  The length of 
confinement will generally be the chief factor in a defendant’s 
decision to plead guilty or challenge the charges against him.155  
Therefore, in order for the defendant to make a fully informed 
decision regarding his plea, common sense dictates that the 
defendant must be given an accurate picture regarding that 
confinement.  Further, because the nature of this consequence—
confinement against one’s will—is so similar to the traditional 
direct consequences, it is difficult to rationalize requiring 
information about these direct consequences, but not about other 
methods of confinement. 
3. Courts Should Be Hesitant To Expand the Realm of 
Consequences Which Are “Not Categorically Removed” from 
Sixth Amendment Protection 
Though some of the consequences listed above—as well as 
some which are not listed—may appear to be “intimately related 
to the criminal process,”156 courts should be careful in making 
any expansion of the “not categorically removed” consequences.  
This test must be very strictly applied because, since almost any 
consequence of a criminal conviction bears some relation to the  
 
 
151 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365–66. 
152 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
153 See Chin & Holmes, supra note 50, at 705. 
154 Roberts, supra note 64, at 185–86 n.278. 
155 Welsh S. White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. 
PA. L. REV. 439, 440 (1971). 
156 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365. 
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criminal process, a liberal use of this test will swallow the effort 
made by the Court to establish the uniqueness of deportation.  
The question is necessarily one of degree. 
The Padilla Court was particularly influenced by the high 
degree to which deportation and criminal convictions had become 
entangled in the last one hundred years of the country’s history.  
In Section I of the Court’s opinion—before the Court even 
considered the Sixth Amendment—the Court detailed the long 
history of immigration and deportation in this country.157  
Particularly, the Court noted the existence and elimination of the 
JRAD.158  JRAD was interpreted to give the trial judge 
“conclusive authority” over a convict’s deportation status; a 
judge’s recommendation bound the executive branch and 
prevented deportation.159  The Court noted that lower courts 
deciding Sixth Amendment claims considered JRAD to be not 
merely “intimately related” to the conviction, but “part of the 
sentencing” itself.160  It would make little sense for deportation to 
be a protected consequence when the possibility of judicial relief 
existed, but unprotected once that failsafe was taken away. 
It is also noteworthy that to the extent that there was an 
exception to the direct-collateral rule before Padilla, that 
exception was deportation.  Though some courts, like the 
Supreme Court of Kentucky, ruled that deportation was a 
“collateral” consequence and thus unprotected by the Sixth 
Amendment,161 many other jurisdictions recognized a noncitizen’s 
right to Sixth Amendment protection for possible deportation 
stemming from a criminal conviction.162  This Sixth Amendment 
protection was recognized through state statutes,163 court rules,164 
and case law.165 
The unique development of deportation as a consequence of 
conviction as well as the existence of exceptions for deportation 
in some jurisdictions illustrate the special circumstances under 
which the Court wrote its decision.  Though there are certainly 
 
157 Id. at 360–64. 
158 Id. at 361–64. 
159 Id. at 362 (citing Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449, 452 (2d Cir. 1986)). 
160 Id. at 363–65. 
161 See id. at 365 n.9. 
162 See Chin & Holmes, supra note 50, at 708. 
163 Id. at 708 n.119. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 708. 
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other consequences that are “enmeshed” with criminal 
convictions, the question of whether these consequences should 
be deemed “not categorically removed” from Strickland analysis 
is necessarily one of degree. 
B. When Are “Categorically Removed” Consequences Subject to 
the Strickland Test? 
The harshness of the bright-line between categorically 
removed and not categorically removed consequences can be 
ameliorated through the use of two exceptions to the rule.  The 
first exception, the affirmative misadvice exception, is already 
recognized in most jurisdictions and protects defendants when 
their attorneys misstate the law.166  The second exception, 
attorney knowledge plus nonadvice, extends the misadvice 
protection to instances where attorneys actually or reasonably 
should know the law yet remain silent.167  Further, the attorney 
knowledge plus nonadvice exception cures the concern over the 
incentives promoted by the affirmative misadvice exception. 
1. Affirmative Misadvice 
Some lower courts in the United States have developed an 
exception to the direct-collateral rule for “affirmative 
misadvice.”168  These courts disregard the direct-collateral 
distinction when an attorney gives his or her client “affirmative 
misadvice” and will allow the defendant to withdraw the guilty 
plea, or at least proceed to the prejudice prong of Strickland.169  
Though the affirmative misadvice exception generally entitles 
defendants to Sixth Amendment relief for collateral 
consequences, there is disagreement as to when exactly the 
exception applies. 
 
166 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 484–85 (Ky. 2008), 
rev’d, Padilla, 559 U.S. 356. 
167 See, e.g., Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 62 (1985) (White, J., concurring). 
168 See, e.g., United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1015 (9th Cir. 2005); United 
States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 188 (2d Cir. 2002). Other courts, including the 
Supreme Court of Kentucky in Padilla, refused to acknowledge this exception and 
held fast to the direct-collateral distinction. See Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 485. 
169 See Roberti v. State, 782 So. 2d 919, 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) 
(“Affirmative misadvice about even a collateral consequence of a plea constitutes 
ineffective assistance of counsel and provides a basis on which to withdraw the 
plea.”). 
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The affirmative misadvice exception is controversial because 
some scholars and courts see the exception as encouraging 
“incompetent”—or at least discouraging “competent”—attorney 
advice.170  These courts and commentators point out that the 
affirmative misadvice exception incentivizes attorney silence.171  
This is because the attorney who makes an effort to advise his or 
her client but misstates the law in good faith will be subject to an 
ineffective assistance claim while the attorney who remains 
silent will not.172  Compounding this disincentive, the argument 
continues, will be judges who, in the interest of ensuring the 
finality of pleas, will discourage attorney advice on collateral 
consequences to avoid any chance that incorrect advice would 
render a plea subject to withdrawal. 
The Court in Padilla recognized these concerns with the 
affirmative misadvice exception.  The Solicitor General, in an 
amicus brief, urged the Court to limit its holding to affirmative 
misadvice and not require defense counsel to provide advice on 
deportation.173  The Court rejected this argument, saying that to 
limit its holding to apply to only affirmative misadvice on 
deportation would produce “absurd results.”174  The first absurd 
result cited by the court was the incentive for attorneys “to 
remain silent . . . even when answers are readily available.”175  
The second absurd result was that such a limited holding would 
deny noncitizens the right to any advice on deportation, even the 
most basic advice available.176  To avoid these absurd results, the 
Court held that, for consequences “like deportation,” attorneys 
are required to provide their clients with available advice; the 
failure to do so violated the competence prong of Strickland.177 
It should be noted that, like the Court’s holding that 
Strickland applied to Padilla’s claim, the holding regarding 
misadvice came with a significant limitation:  Advice was only 
required for consequences “like deportation.”178  This duty to 
advise, therefore, should not be generally applied.  However, the 
 
170 See Roberts, supra note 64, at 140–42. 
171 Id. 
172 See id. at 142. 
173 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 369 (2010). 
174 Id. at 369–70. 
175 Id. at 370. 
176 Id. at 370–71. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
FINAL_REGAN 2/27/2014  6:29 PM 
2013] THE PROPER BORDERS OF PADILLA 697 
rest of the Padilla opinion shows that this category of 
consequences expands beyond those that are just “not 
categorically removed.”179 
2. Attorney Knowledge Plus Nonadvice Exception 
Despite whatever extra protection the affirmative misadvice 
exception provides for defendants, the exception raises 
significant concerns over attorney incentives.  These concerns 
can be adequately addressed by extending the affirmative 
misadvice exception to occurrences of attorney nonadvice, if it 
can be shown that the attorney knew, or should have known, that 
the consequence was looming over the plea.  Though there may 
be concerns that a defendant, who is unlikely to record the 
happenings of meetings with his attorney, will have trouble 
proving actual knowledge of a consequence, Supreme Court 
precedent demonstrates two ways in which knowledge may be 
presumed. 
The first instance where attorney knowledge may be 
presumed is revealed in Padilla.  In applying Strickland’s first 
prong, the Court looked at the deportation statute at hand,180 
which it noted was “succinct, clear, and explicit in defining the 
removal consequence[s]” that Padilla was subject to.181  The 
clarity of the statute, the Court found, mandated that Padilla’s 
attorney give his client detailed advice.182  Because Strickland 
was already held to apply to Padilla’s claim, the “succinct, clear, 
and explicit” nature of the statute only determined the level of 
advice an attorney was required to give his or her client.183 
Though the Court in Padilla used the clarity of the relevant 
statute to determine the level of advice required, a similar test 
could be used to determine whether advice was required at all.  
Under this test, if a defendant can show that the statute from 
which the relevant consequence stems is “succinct, clear, and 
explicit” in its application to the defendant and the crime he or 
she is charged with, Strickland will apply to the defendant’s 
claim. 
 
179 Id. at 366. 
180 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012). 
181 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368. 
182 Id. at 369. 
183 Id. at 368–69. 
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The second instance where attorney knowledge may be 
presumed is shown in Justice White’s concurrence in Hill v. 
Lockhart.  Though the majority decided this case under the 
prejudice prong of Strickland, thereby avoiding the issue of 
attorney advice,184 Justice White analyzed the case under the 
competence prong, ultimately deciding that the ineffective 
assistance claim based on attorney’s nonadvice in that instance 
failed the competence prong because the attorney had no 
knowledge that the consequence was looming.185  Justice White 
determined that the attorney had no knowledge of the 
consequence by referring to a “plea statement.”186  Justice White 
reasoned that the plea statement, which the defendant had 
reviewed for accuracy, showed the attorney’s lack of knowledge 
that the consequence—in this case “second offender status”—
defeated the petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim.187  Without 
knowledge that this consequence loomed, the attorney’s failure to 
advise could not be said to be unreasonable, thus the claim failed 
Strickland’s competence prong.188 
Similar to what Justice White concluded in Hill, other 
defendants can show that their attorney knew or should have 
known that a consequence was looming.  Indeed, the Court noted 
in Padilla that the plea form used by Kentucky criminal courts 
contained notice of the potential for deportation consequences.189 
This second exception, based on attorney knowledge, cures 
the defects inherent to the affirmative misadvice exception.  
Rather than promoting attorney silence, this exception will 
encourage attorneys to make a reasonable investigation into the 
relevant law if they are interested in protecting the finality of 
 
184 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 60 (1985). 
185 Id. at 60–62 (White, J., concurring). 
186 Id. at 6162. The consequence at issue in Hill was heightened sentencing for 
a repeat felony offender. The defendant in the case filled out, or at least reviewed, a 
form in which “0” was written in the section for prior convictions. This, in the 
concurring Justices’ eyes, provided proof that the defendant’s attorney had no 
knowledge of the prior conviction, and thus his failure to inform the defendant of the 
heightened sentencing could not be incompetent under Strickland. Id. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. Also, the defendant did not claim that he had told his attorney otherwise 
or that he had indicated that the form had been filled out incorrectly. Id. at 61. 
189 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 n.15 (2010). It is important to 
remember, though, that attorney nonadvice was not at issue in Padilla; Padilla’s 
attorney had affirmatively advised his client that he was not at risk of deportation. 
Id. at 359. Padilla would therefore have fallen into the affirmative misadvice 
exception, even if a consequence other than deportation was at issue. 
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their guilty pleas.  This is because a failure to advise about a 
consequence derived from a “succinct, clear, and explicit” statute 
will render the plea just as uncertain as affirmative misadvice.  
The judge presiding over the plea will share this incentive and 
can help to alert the defense attorney as to the consequences 
which may be looming for the attorney’s client. 
Incentivizing this initial investigation into the consequences 
of a plea has benefits beyond the incentive itself.  First, this 
investigation and advice can lead to better guilty pleas.  As many 
courts and commentators note, the consequences formerly 
deemed “collateral” may be of greater importance to a defendant 
than those deemed “direct.”190  Defense attorneys, prosecutors, 
and judges can use the importance of these consequences to the 
defendant to negotiate creative plea agreements, where stiffer 
“direct” punishments can be traded off for leniency in regard to 
collateral consequences. 
This would avoid circumstances like that posited in Chin and 
Holmes’s “hypothetical ‘war story’ ”: 
I represented someone charged with DUI, and due to my 
excellent advocacy the prosecutor accepted a guilty plea with a 
one-day sentence instead of the three days imposed in almost 
every similar case.  As an interesting aside, my client and his 
family were then deported based on the conviction; I have no 
idea whether I could have negotiated a deal resulting in 
conviction of a non-deportable offense; status as an alien does 
not affect the fine or length of incarceration, so I never 
considered it. The results of this case demonstrate my 
remarkable legal abilities.191 
In this hypothetical, the attorney would make the initial 
investigation into deportation because if he did not, and the 
statute was “succinct, clear, and explicit” like in Padilla, he 
would risk having the plea invalidated in a collateral proceeding.  
After learning about the potential for deportation, he may have 
had the chance to negotiate an agreement with the prosecutor, 
where his client could offer to serve more time in prison—
perhaps a week—if the prosecutor could change the charge to a 
nondeportable offense. 
 
190 See Roberts, supra note 63, at 674. 
191 See Chin & Holmes, supra note 50, at 718. 
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CONCLUSION 
The plea-bargaining stage is a critical point in any criminal 
proceeding.192  The Supreme Court recognized this in 1985 when, 
in Hill v. Lockhart, it held that the protections of the Sixth 
Amendment extended to this stage.193  In recent years, as the 
prevalence of guilty pleas has increased, the Court has begun to 
scrutinize this phase at an unprecedented depth.194 
In evaluating attorney advice during plea bargaining, the 
Court came across an area rife with difficult line-drawing and 
policy problems.  Compounding the problem was the widely 
accepted direct-collateral doctrine, which had significantly 
muddied the waters of Sixth Amendment law for plea bargains.  
Against this background, the Court opted to issue only a limited 
decision, holding only that the direct-collateral distinction was 
ill-suited for deportation.  The limits on this decision must be 
respected and courts should be very hesitant to impose an 
overarching duty of correct affirmative advice beyond the 
traditionally direct consequences, which now includes 
deportation.  Any extension of Sixth Amendment protection 
beyond these categories should focus on attorney knowledge, so 
that courts avoid conflating the competence prong of Strickland 
with its separate prejudice prong. 
By focusing on attorney knowledge, rather than importance 
to the defendant, courts applying Strickland and Padilla can 
properly respond to concerns about both institutional burdens 
and fairness to individual defendants.  This focus also properly 
centers the competence prong analysis on attorney action, and 
will incentivize diligent and efficient attorney behavior.  To do 
otherwise would be to take individual discretion away from 
attorneys during plea bargaining—a stage when such discretion 
is most needed. 
 
 
192 Bibas, supra note 98, at 1118–20. 
193 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985). 
194 Bibas, supra note 98, at 1118–20. 
